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Abstract
It is well known that n bits of entropy are necessary and sufficient to perfectly encrypt n
bits (one-time pad). Even if we allow the encryption to be approximate, the amount of entropy
needed doesn’t asymptotically change. However, this is not the case when we are encrypting
quantum bits. For the perfect encryption of n quantum bits, 2n bits of entropy are necessary
and sufficient (quantum one-time pad), but for approximate encryption one asymptotically needs
only n bits of entropy. In this paper, we provide the optimal trade-off between the approximation
measure ǫ and the amount of classical entropy used in the encryption of single quantum bits.
Then, we consider n-qubit encryption schemes which are a composition of independent single-
qubit ones and provide the optimal schemes both in the 2- and the ∞-norm. Moreover, we
provide a counterexample to show that the encryption scheme of Ambainis-Smith [3] based on
small-bias sets does not work in the ∞-norm.
I Introduction
Secure transmission of information is a subject that has been studied extensively. In this model,
Alice wants to securely transmit a message to Bob using a secret key that they both share, in
such a way that any eavesdropper gets absolutely no information about the message sent. In the
classical world, Shannon [11, 12] has shown that for the perfect encryption of n classical bits, it is
necessary and sufficient to use n bits of classical entropy (one-time pad). By performing a bitwise
XOR between the n-bit message and the n-bit secret key, the view of any eavesdropper that has no
knowledge of the key is just a uniformly random n-bit string. Ambainis, Mosca, Tapp and deWolf
[2] showed that 2n classical bits of entropy are necessary and sufficient for the transmission of n
quantum bits.
Let us briefly sketch how one can perfectly encrypt a quantum bit. Let ρ be the state of an
arbitrary qubit and let I,X, Y, Z be the four Pauli matrices. Then, by using two bits of classical
entropy we can uniformly pick one of the four matrices and apply it to our qubit. The state of the
qubit after the encryption is
E(ρ) = 1
4
(ρ+XρX + Y ρY + ZρZ)
It’s easy to verify that for all states ρ, E(ρ) = 12 I and hence the view of the eavesdropper is the
completely mixed state, i.e. she gets no information about the encrypted state ρ. The scheme
easily generalizes to n-qubit states by using 2n classical bits of entropy.
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The entropy needed for the perfect encryption of quantum states is two times what is needed
for the perfect encryption of classical bits. Interestingly, this is no longer true, when we look at
approximate encryption. Let ρ ∈ Cd×d be the state of a (log d)-qubit message, {Uk ∈ Cd×d|k ∈ [N ]}
be a set of N unitary operations acting on log d qubits and D = {w1, . . . , wN} be a distribution
on [N ]. Imagine the encryption scheme, where Alice picks a unitary Uk with probability wk and
applies it to the message. The ciphertext can be written as
E(ρ) =
∑
k∈[N ]
wkUkρU
†
k
and the entropy of the scheme is defined as the Shannon entropy H(D).
Definition 1 The map E is a (ǫ,H)-approximate encryption scheme for the∞-norm, if the entropy
of the scheme is H and for all states ρ ∥∥∥∥E(ρ)− Id
∥∥∥∥
∞
≤ ǫ
d
.
Similarly, the map E is a (ǫ,H)-approximate encryption scheme for the 2-norm, if the entropy of
the scheme is H and for all states ρ ∥∥∥∥E(ρ)− Id
∥∥∥∥
2
≤ ǫ√
d
.
Hayden, Leung, Shor and Winter [5] found an (ǫ, n+ o(n))-approximate encryption scheme for
n qubits. Specifically, they showed that an encryption scheme that applies a unitary on ρ picked
uniformly from a random set of unitaries of size 2n+o(n) achieves ǫ-approximation. Ambainis and
Smith [3] derandomized this construction using small-bias sets and constructed deterministically a
set of 2n+o(n) unitaries that achieves an (ǫ, n + o(n))-approximation for the 2-norm.
On the other hand, it is not hard to see that for the classical case, one needs at least n−log(1− ǫ2 )
bits of entropy for an ǫ-approximation scheme. Hence, the entropy needed for the approximate
encryption of classical and quantum states is asymptotically equal.
In this paper, we start by investigating the approximate encryption of single qubits and find
the optimal trade-off between the approximation measure ǫ and the amount of classical entropy H,
i.e. we calculate the least amount of classical entropy which is necessary and sufficient to achieve
an ǫ-approximation. Our proof is constructive in the sense that for any given ǫ we describe the
encryption scheme that achieves the optimal H and vice versa. The following theorem holds both
for the ∞- and 2-norm. Note the weights in the distributions are in decreasing order.
Theorem 1 Let E(ρ) be the optimal (ǫ,H)-approximate encryption scheme for a qubit. Then,
1. The encryption is of the form E(ρ) = wρ+ xXρX + yY ρY + zZρZ.
2. For any fixed ǫ, the optimal distribution D (and hence the minimum entropy H) is:
(i) ǫ ≤ 1/6 : D = {14 + ǫ2 , 14 + ǫ2 , 14 + ǫ2 , 14 − 3ǫ2 },
(ii) 1/6 ≤ ǫ ≤ 0.287 : D = {2ǫ, 12 − ǫ, 12 − ǫ, 0},
(iii) ǫ ≥ 0.287 : D = {14 + 3ǫ2 , 14 − ǫ2 , 14 − ǫ2 , 14 − ǫ2}.
In Section II we find the optimal Pauli encryption scheme for a qubit and in Section III we show
that Pauli encryption schemes are no worse than general encryption schemes.
Next, in Section IV we consider n-qubit encryption schemes which are a composition of inde-
pendent single-qubit schemes that each use entropy H. In general, such questions are not easy
to tackle, since they hinge on notoriously hard questions on the additivity of quantum channels.
However, in this case we only consider unitary operations and hence we can use a result of King
[6] in order to find the optimal schemes.
Theorem 2 Let P be the single-qubit Pauli encryption scheme, which achieves the optimal approx-
imation ǫ for the given entropy H. Then, the optimal n-qubit independent encryption scheme R(ρ)
is the same for both the 2- and the ∞-norm and has the following properties:
1. R(ρ) = P⊗n(ρ).
2.
∥∥R(ρ)− I2n∥∥2 ≤ √n ǫ2n/2 + o(ǫ√n)2n/2 .
3.
∥∥R(ρ)− I2n∥∥∞ ≤ n ǫ2n + o(nǫ)2n .
The above bounds are tight and hence for any encryption scheme that acts independently on each
qubit, 2n− o(n) bits of entropy are necessary for approximate encryption.
Finally, in Section V we discuss non-independent n-qubit encryption schemes. In particular, we
are interested in the Ambainis-Smith small-bias set based scheme. In [3], they found a (ǫ, n+o(n))-
approximate encryption scheme for the 2-norm. Their scheme uses a deterministically constructed
small-bias set of 2n-bit strings of size 2n+o(n), where each string corresponds to a unitary which is a
tensor product of n Pauli matrices. The message is encrypted by picking uniformly a unitary from
this set. One of the open questions in their paper is whether this scheme is also an (ǫ, n + o(n))-
approximate encryption scheme for the ∞-norm. We resolve this by finding an example of an
asymptotically optimal small-bias set, for which the encryption scheme of Ambainis-Smith fails in
the ∞-norm. However, it is possible that an (ǫ, n + o(n))-approximate encryption scheme for the
∞-norm can be constructed in a different way, for example by using a small-bias set with some
extra properties.
II The Optimal Pauli Encryption Scheme
The input state to our encryption scheme is a quantum bit which can be described by a density
matrix ρ, i.e. a hermitian matrix with unit trace
ρ =
1
2
(I+ rxX + ryY + rzZ) , (1)
where ~r = (rx, ry, rz) is a unit vector, and the four Pauli matrices are
I =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, X =
[
0 1
1 0
]
, Y =
[
0 −i
i 0
]
, Z =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
.
Let us denote +1 eigenvectors of the matrices X,Y and Z by |x+〉 , |y+〉 and |z+〉.
A Pauli encryption scheme for single qubits is described by a probability distribution on the
four Pauli matrices, i.e. by a probability vector D = (w, x, y, z), such that the encryption of a qubit
ρ is given by
EIXY Z(ρ) = wρ+ xXρX + yY ρY + zZρZ. (2)
3
Without loss of generality, we can assume the weights {w, x, y, z} obey w ≥ z ≥ x ≥ y ≥ 0.
The reason for this is that these four unitaries are freely interchangeable by picking a suitable
ρ = Uρ′U †. If the original qubit ρ was encoded by E(ρ), with weights {w, x, y, z}, we can achieve
the same encoding E′(ρ′) on the transformed qubit ρ′, just with {w, x, y, z} permuted.
The classical entropy used by the encryption scheme is the entropy of the probability distribu-
tion, i.e. H({pi}) = −
∑
i pi log2 pi = −w logw − x log x− y log y − z log z.
To test how good the encryption scheme is, we want to know how much the encrypted state
differs from the completely mixed state in the 2- and the operator norm. For any d-dimensional
matrix A, the 2- and operator norm are related to the eigenvalues of the matrix, namely
‖A‖22 =
d∑
k=1
λ2k, ‖A‖∞ = max
k
|λk|
Thus, for the operator norm we need to examine the maximum of the absolute value of the eigen-
values of
I(ρ) = EIXY Z(ρ)− 1
2
I.
Note, that since the matrix I(ρ) has trace equal to 0, the two eigenvalues are of the form ±λ and
hence, the 2-norm is maximized simultaneously with the operator norm.
II.1 The maximum eigenvalue of I(ρ)
After applying the channel (2) to the density matrix described by (1), we obtain
EIXY Z(ρ) = 1
2
(
I+ r′xX + r
′
yY + r
′
zZ
)
,
where the new parameters can be easily determined from (2) using the anticommutation relations
for Pauli matrices.
r′x = (w + x− z − y)rx = (2(w + x)− 1)rx,
r′y = (w + y − z − x)ry = (2(w + y)− 1)ry,
r′z = (w + z − x− y)rz = (2(w + z)− 1)rz .
This shows that the parameters rx, ry and rz shrink according to the above relations. The factors
can be negative, but because have w ≥ z ≥ x ≥ y and w + z + x + y = 1, with a little work one
can verify that the magnitude of the shrinking factor |2(w + z) − 1| in front of rz is the largest of
the three.
Using the geometric description (1) of ρ, we can express the matrix I(ρ) as
I(ρ) = E(ρ)− 12I =
1
2
(
r′xX + r
′
yY + r
′
zZ
)
.
Its eigenvalues are then simply
λI(ρ) = ±
1
2
|~r′|.
Our goal is to find the maximum eigenvalue |λI(ρ)| over all states ρ as a function of the probability
distribution D = (w, z, x, y) and then pick the distribution that minimizes it. Already knowing that
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the shrinking factor in front of rz is the largest, we can maximize |λI(ρ)| = 12(1 + |~r′|) by picking ρ
with ~r = (0, 0, 1). This gives us ~r′ = (0, 0, 2(w + z)− 1), and
maxρ|λI(ρ)| =
∣∣∣∣w + z − 12
∣∣∣∣ , (3)
Note that w and z are the two largest weights and therefore we always have w + z ≥ 12 .
We thank the referees for pointing out a geometric view of the Pauli encoding in [8], which
simplified the proof in this section.
II.2 The optimal trade-off between approximation and entropy
In Section II.1, we found an upper bound on the maximum eigenvalue of I(ρ) as a function of the
probability distribution used by the Pauli encryption scheme. Note also that equation (3) shows
that for a perfect encryption the only possible scheme is the one that uses a uniform distribution
over the four Pauli matrices.
The natural question is to find the optimal Pauli encryption scheme when we can only use
a fixed amount H of classical entropy. Turning the question around, we fix the approximation
parameter ǫ and calculate the necessary entropy to achieve it.
Let us fix ǫ = maxρ|λ| = w+z−1/2. In addition, the condition w ≥ z implies that 1/4+ǫ/2 ≥ z.
Our goal is to minimize the classical entropy needed to achieve approximation ǫ:
H(ǫ) = minD (−w logw − z log z − x log x− y log y) .
Keeping x, y and ǫ fixed, the entropy as a function of z is concave, with a maximum at z = w.
Because z ≤ w, the entropy decreases with decreasing z. Specifically, if z > x+ y, one can decrease
the entropy by setting z = x+ y (and increasing w accordingly, to keep ǫ fixed). Without loss of
generality, one can then assume that z ≤ x+y for the optimal D. Now, let us minimize the entropy
as a function of x. It is concave in x, with a maximum at x = y = (1 − w − z)/2 and possible
minima at the endpoints. Because x ≥ y, we want to pick x as large as possible. Because x ≤ z
and z ≤ x+ y, this results in x = z. The weights that minimize the entropy for a fixed ǫ thus are
(as a function of z)
w = 1/2 + ǫ− z, x = z, y = 1/2 − ǫ− z.
To find the optimal H(ǫ), one thus needs to minimize
H(ǫ, z) = −
(
1
2
+ ǫ− z
)
log
(
1
2
+ ǫ− z
)
− 2z log z −
(
1
2
− ǫ− z
)
log
(
1
2
− ǫ− z
)
.
with respect to z, remembering the constraints collected so far (w ≥ z ≥ x ≥ y ≥ 0, x+ y ≥ z):
1
4
+
ǫ
2
≥ z ≥ 1
4
− ǫ
2
, (4)
1
2
− ǫ ≥ z. (5)
We perform this minimization in Appendix A.1 and conclude that for ǫ ≤ 1/6, picking the three
larger weights to be equal is the entropy-minimizing strategy. For 1/6 ≤ ǫ ≤ ǫ0, picking only three
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unitaries, with two of the lower weights equal is the best choice. For ǫ0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1/2, it is optimal to
pick the three smaller weights to be equal.
Turning the argument around – given entropy H, what is the optimal Pauli encryption scheme?
There is a unique way to pick the probability distribution with the given entropy that minimizes
the parameter ǫ.
(i) H ≥ log23 : D = (z, z, z, 1 − 3z),
(ii) log23 ≥ H ≥ H0 : D = (1− 2z, z, z, 0),
(iii) H0 ≥ H : D = (1− 3z, z, z, z).
(6)
Note that the weights are in descending order and that the approximation ǫ is given by the sum of
the largest two weights minus 12 . Also, one should not expect the optimal distribution parameters
to be continuous at H0. These two ways of picking the weights come from different regions in
the parameter space {w, z, x, y}, and the choice of the optimal distribution is simply a numerical
minimum of these two functions. The point H0 (or equivalently ǫ0) does not have an obvious special
meaning.
III The optimality of Pauli Encryption Schemes
In this section we give an elementary constructive proof that the Pauli encryption schemes are
no worse than any general encryption scheme. For any encryption scheme E(ρ) = ∑k pkUkρU †k
with arbitrary unitaries and weights, we give a Pauli encryption scheme with weights {w, z, x, y}
that has lower entropy, and is no worse than E(ρ). We show this by finding a density matrix ρ0,
for which the maximum eigenvalue of I(ρ0) is the same as in (3), which is the worst case for the
newly found Pauli scheme. Hence, the Pauli encryption scheme of section II is optimal amongst all
possible encryption schemes.
After completion of this work, we learned of an alternative proof of optimality of Pauli encryp-
tion for a single qubit by Bouda and Ziman [4]. They investigated perfect encryption of a subspace
of the Bloch sphere, while we are interested in approximate encryption of the whole Bloch sphere.
Their proof uses the Kraus representation of the quantum channel, showing that the representation
of a channel using orthogonal matrices requires the least amount of entropy. We also thank the
anonymous referee for providing us with another shorter proof. Using the fact that every channel
can be expressed also as a Pauli channel ([10]), we can utilize a clever trick by Nielsen ([9]) to prove
that the weights of this Pauli channel majorize the weights of the original channel. Knowing that
the entropy is concave, we can conclude that the Pauli realization of the channel requires the least
amount of entropy. The details of this proof are given in Appendix A.2. Let us now continue with
our proof.
Let T be an encryption scheme with distribution {w1, w2, . . . , wN} over N unitaries Uk, where
the weights are in decreasing order. We parametrize the unitaries as Uk = e
iαkeiφk(~nk ·~σ), where
~nk = (xk, yk, zk) and ~σ = (X,Y,Z). The phases αk are not important in our analysis and hence,
we denote the parametrization of Uk only as U(φk, ~nk).
We have the following three cases:
Case 1: w1 + w2 − 1/2 ≤ 0
We show that the entropy H of the encryption scheme T is greater or equal to 2, and for H = 2,
we already know a perfect encoding with four unitaries and wk = 1/4. It is clear, that if w1 < 1/4
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then the entropy is larger than 2. Let us assume that w1 ≥ 1/4. From the concavity of the Shannon
entropy, we know that the entropy of a distribution that contains two weights (wk, wl) with wk ≥ wl
decreases if we change them into (wk +∆, wl −∆).
Hence we can decrease the entropy of the initial distribution {w1, w2, . . . , wN} by increasing the
weight w2 to make it equal to w
′
2 = 1/2− w1 and decreasing some of the smaller weights. We can
further decrease the entropy by making the middle weights all equal, i.e {w1, w′2, w′2, . . . , w′2, wN}.
Picking w1 = x fully determines the distribution, giving w
′
2 = 1/2−x and wN = (4−N)/2+(N−3)x.
The constraints 1/2 ≥ w1 ≥ w2 ≥ wN ≥ 0 give us:
N − 3
2(N − 2) ≥ x ≥
N − 4
2(N − 3) . (7)
The entropy as a function of x is concave (the second derivative is negative) and therefore,
we look for the minimum entropy at the endpoints, given in (7). These endpoints correspond to
choosing the distribution as {w1, w2, . . . , w2} with w2 = (1 − w1)/(N − 1). The entropy of such
distributions as a function of N is
H(N) = −w1 logw1 − (N − 1)w2 logw2 = − N − 3
2(N − 2) log(N − 3) + 1 + log(N − 2).
It’s easy to see that this function is a monotone, growing function of N with a minimum for
H(4) = 2. We conclude that any encryption scheme with n ≥ 5 unitaries and w1 + w2 − 1/2 < 0
uses entropy H ≥ 2 and hence is worse than the perfect encryption scheme with four unitaries.
Case 2: w1 + w2 − 1/2 ≥ 0 and
∑n
k=3wk ≤ 2w2.
We show that there exists a Pauli encryption scheme that is no worse than T and uses less
entropy. Let P be the Pauli scheme that uses the distribution {w1, w2, w2, w′3}. This is possible by
the constraint
∑n
k=3wk ≤ 2w2 and from the concavity of the entropy, P uses less entropy. We also
know from equation (3) that for the encryption scheme P
maxρ|λI(ρ)| =
∣∣∣∣w1 + w2 − 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Without loss of generality, when encoding an input density matrix ρ with the set of unitaries
U(φ1, ~n1), U(φ2, ~n2), U(φ3, ~n3), . . . , U(φn, ~nn)
one can equivalently analyze the encoding of the density matrix ρ′ = U †1ρU1 with a related set of
unitaries:
I, U(φ′2, ~n
′
2), U(φ
′
3, ~n
′
3), . . . , U(φ
′
n, ~n
′
n).
The approximation parameter ǫ of the encoding scheme is basis independent, it is now convenient
to pick a basis in which the unitaries are of the form
I, Zα2 , (z3Z + x3X + y3Y )α3 , . . . , (znZ + xnX + ynY )αn ,
where x2k + y
2
k + z
2
k = 1, and Zα2 denotes a rotation about the z-axis, namely Zα2 = e
−iα2Z =
(cosα2)I− i(sinα2)Z.
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Let us now check how well the |z+〉 state is encoded.
ρ = |z+〉 〈z+| =
[
1 0
0 0
]
.
Note that since ρ is an eigenstate of Z, it commutes with Zα2 . After some algebraic manipulations
we have:
I(ρ) = E(ρ)− 1
2
I =
[ (
w1 + w2 − 12
)
+ (
∑n
k=3wkAk) (
∑n
k=3wkBk)
∗
(
∑n
k=3wkBk) −
(
w1 + w2 − 12
)− (∑nk=3wkAk)
]
,
where
Ak = cos
2 αk + z
2
k sin
2 αk,
Bk = (cosαk + izk sinαk) (xk − iyk) i sinαk.
The eigenvalues of I(ρ) are now
λ2I(ρ) =
[(
w1 + w2 − 1
2
)
+
(
n∑
k=3
wkAi
)]2
+
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
k=3
wkBk
∣∣∣∣∣
2
.
We know that w1 + w2 − 1/2 ≥ 0 and Ak ≥ 0. Thus we can bound the eigenvalues as
λ2I(ρ) ≥
(
w1 + w2 − 1
2
)2
,
with w1 and w2 the two largest weights. The equality is achieved if we pick our unitaries with
zk = 0 and cosαk = 0, which imply Ak = Bk = 0.
This is the same result as in equation (3) and hence no matter how we pick the unitaries, the
encryption cannot be better than in the Pauli Encryption scheme.
Case 3: w1 + w2 − 1/2 ≥ 0 and
∑n
k=3wk ≥ 2w2.
Since w1+w2 ≥ 1/2, we conclude that w1 ≥ 1/4 ≥ 13(w2+
∑n
k=3wk) and so, it’s possible to con-
sider the Pauli scheme P that uses the distribution {w1, 13(w2+
∑n
k=3wk),
1
3(w2+
∑n
k=3wk),
1
3 (w2+∑n
k=3wk)}. Moreover, the constraint
∑n
k=3wk ≥ 2w2 implies that 13(w2 +
∑n
k=3wk) ≥ w2 and
hence from the concavity of the entropy, P uses less entropy than T . From equation 3, we know
that for the encryption scheme P
maxρ|λI(ρ)| =
∣∣∣∣∣w1 + 13(w2 +
n∑
k=3
wk)− 1
2
∣∣∣∣∣ . (8)
In what follows, we calculate how well the states |z+〉 , |x+〉 and |y+〉 are encrypted by T and prove
that at least one of them is encoded worse than in the Pauli scheme P .
We pick the unitaries of T to be
I, Zα2 , (z3Z + x3X + y3Y )α3 , . . . , (znZ + xnX + ynY )αn .
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Similarly to Case 2, the |z+〉 state is encoded no better than with
λ2z ≥
(
w1 + w2 +
n∑
k=3
wk(cos
2 αk + sin
2 αk cos
2 βk)− 1
2
)2
,
where we named zk = cosβk, xk = sin βk cos γk and yk = sin βk sin γk Let us now check how well
the |x+〉 state is encoded.
ρx =
1
2
[
1 1
1 1
]
Zα2ρxZ
†
α2 =
1
2
[
1 e−2iα2
e2iα2 1
]
UkρxU
†
k =
1
2
[
1 + Ck Dk − iEk
Dk + iEk 1−Ck
]
,
where Dk = (−1 + 2 cos2 αk + 2 sin2 αk sin2 βk cos2 γk) and Ck, Ek are functions of αk, βk, γk which
do not affect the bounds. The encoding of ρx becomes
I(ρx) = E(ρx)− I
2
= w1IρxI+ w2Zα2ρxZα2 +
∑
k≥3
wkUkρxU
†
i −
I
2
=
1
2
[ ∑
k≥3wkCk F − iG
F + iG −∑k≥3wkCk
]
,
where F = w1−w2 +2w2 cos2 α2 +
∑
k≥3wkDk and G = w2 sin 2α+
∑
k≥3wkEk. We are ready to
bound the eigenvalue:
λ2x =
1
4

∑
k≥3
wkCk


2
+
1
4
G2 +
1
4
F 2 ≥ 1
4
F 2
=
1
4

w1 − w2 + 2w2 cos2 α2 +∑
k≥3
wk(−1 + 2 cos2 αk + 2 sin2 αk sin2 βk cos2 γk)


2
=

w1 + w2 cos2 α2 +∑
k≥3
wk cos
2 αk +
n∑
k=3
wk sin
2 αk sin
2 βk cos
2 γk − 1
2


2
.
Using the same type of computation as above, we encode the |y+〉 state and obtain a bound for
the eigenvalues of I(ρy) = E(ρy)− I/2:
λ2y ≥

w1 + w2 cos2 α2 +∑
k≥3
wk cos
2 αk +
n∑
k=3
wk sin
2 αk sin
2 βk sin
2 γk − 1
2


2
.
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Summing the three inequalities of the eigenvalues, we obtain that
|λx|+ |λy|+ |λz| ≥

3w1 + w2 + n∑
k=3
wk + (2
∑
k≥2
wk cos
2 αk)− 3
2


≥
(
3w1 + w2 +
n∑
k=3
wk − 3
2
)
.
which implies that at least one of the three λ is greater or equal to (8). This means the Pauli
encryption scheme P is no worse than T , while using less entropy.
This concludes the proof that Pauli Encryption schemes are no worse than general encryption
schemes. This also concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
IV N-qubit independent encryption schemes
In this section we consider n-qubit encryption schemes which are composed of independent single-
qubit schemes, each using H amount of classical entropy1. By independent we mean that the
encryption has the form R(ρ) = (R1 ⊗ . . . ⊗Rn)(ρ).
Theorem 2 Let P be the single-qubit Pauli encryption scheme, which achieves the optimal approx-
imation ǫ for the given entropy H. Then, the optimal n-qubit independent encryption scheme R(ρ)
is the same for both the 2- and the ∞-norm and has the following properties:
1. R(ρ) = P⊗n(ρ).
2.
∥∥R(ρ)− I2n∥∥2 ≤ √n ǫ2n/2 + o(ǫ√n)2n/2 .
3.
∥∥R(ρ)− I2n∥∥∞ ≤ n ǫ2n + o(nǫ)2n .
Proof. We first employ a result by King [6] to show that product states are the worst encoded
states for independent encryption schemes. King proved that the p-norm of a product of unital
channels2 is multiplicative, i.e. for p ≥ 1,
max
ρ
‖R(ρ)‖p =
n∏
i=1
(
max
ξi
‖Ri(ξi)‖p
)
. (9)
This shows that the norm ‖R(ρ)‖p is maximized by a product state ρ = ξ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ξn, where ξi is
the state of the i-th qubit. In our encryption schemes we measure the quality of the approximation
by the maximum of the norm ‖R(ρ)− I/2n‖p, for p = 2 and p = ∞. Let λk be the eigenvalues of
1For clarity of exposition, we assume that for each qubit we use the same amount of classical entropy. All the
results go through in the more general case where for each qubit k we use entropy Hk.
2A quantum channel Φ is unital if it preserves unity, i.e. Φ(I) = I. The encryption schemes we consider here are
unital. The p-norm of a channel R is the maximum of ‖R(ρ)‖p over all input states ρ. Note that the multiplicativity
of the p-norms, and hence the additivity of the capacities of non-unital channels is a main open question [13].
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R(ρ); then, the eigenvalues of R(ρ)− I/2n are (λk − 1/2n) and we have∥∥∥∥R(ρ)− I2n
∥∥∥∥
2
2
=
2n∑
k=1
(
λk − 1
2n
)2
=
2n∑
k=1
(
λ2k − 2
λk
2n
+
1
22n
)
= ‖R(ρ)‖22 −
1
2n
, (10)
∥∥∥∥R(ρ)− I2n
∥∥∥∥
∞
= max
k
(
λk − 1
2n
)
= ‖R(ρ)‖∞ −
1
2n
. (11)
It is clear, that the norm of R(ρ) − I/2n is maximized when the norm of R(ρ) is maximized and
therefore, for any independent encryption scheme the worst encoded state is a product state.
Hence, in order to find the optimal independent encryption scheme, one needs to find the scheme
that encrypts product states optimally. The encryption of a product state R(ξ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ξn) =
R1(ξ1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ Rn(ξn) is also a product state and the eigenvalues of R(ξ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ξn) are simply
products of the eigenvalues of Rk(ξk). Without loss of generality, let us now encrypt a state ξ1⊗ρ2...n
using R = R1 ⊗ R2...n. The eigenvalues of the single-qubit encryption R1(ξ1) can be expressed as
µ1,2 = (1 ± ǫ1)/2 and the eigenvalues of R2...n(ρ2...n) as νk=1,...,2n−1 = (1 + δk)/2n−1. Hence, the
eigenvalues and 2-norm of R(ξ1 ⊗ ρ2...n)− I/2n are
λi,k = µiνk − 1
2n
=
δk ± ǫ1(1 + δk)
2n
, (12)
∥∥∥∥R(ξ1 ⊗ ρ2...n)− I2n
∥∥∥∥
2
2
=
2n−1∑
k=1
2∑
i=1
λ2i,k =
2n−1∑
k=1
δ2k + ǫ
2
1(1 + δk)
2
22n
.
The last expression is a growing function of ǫ1 and therefore, the optimal n-qubit encryption
scheme has to be optimal (i.e. Pauli) on the first qubit, giving the smallest possible upper bound
on ǫ1. After going through this procedure for all qubits, we see that the optimal encryption scheme
for product states in the 2-norm is the Pauli scheme P⊗n. It is straightforward to obtain the
same statement for the ∞-norm using (12). This concludes the proof that the optimal n-qubit
independent encryption scheme for both the 2- and the operator norm is the Pauli scheme P⊗n(ρ).
We now prove tight upper bounds for the quality of the approximation of the Pauli encryption
scheme. For the 2-norm, equation (9) and induction imply
max
ρ
∥∥P⊗n(ρ)∥∥
2
=
(
max
ξ
‖P (ξ)‖2
)n
.
Let us pick ξ to be the worst encoded single-qubit state for P . The eigenvalues of P (ξ) are (1±ǫ)/2
and therefore:
∥∥P⊗n(ρ)∥∥
2
≤ max
ρ
∥∥P⊗n(ρ)∥∥
2
=
((
1 + ǫ
2
)2
+
(
1− ǫ
2
)2)n2
=
(
1 + ǫ2
2
)n
2
.
From equation (10), we bound the 2-norm of P⊗n(ρ)− I/2n as∥∥∥∥P⊗n(ρ)− I2n
∥∥∥∥
2
=
[∥∥P⊗n(ρ)∥∥2
2
− 1
2n
] 1
2
≤
[(
1 + ǫ2
2
)n
− 1
2n
] 1
2
=
ǫ
√
n
2n/2
+
o(ǫ
√
n)
2n/2
.
For the ∞-norm, multiplicativity of norms (9) implies
∥∥P⊗n(ρ)∥∥∞ ≤ maxρ ∥∥P⊗n(ρ)∥∥∞ = maxξ ‖P (ξ)‖n∞ =
(
1 + ǫ
2
)n
,
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and therefore equation (11) gives us∥∥∥∥P⊗n(ρ)− I2n
∥∥∥∥
∞
=
∥∥P⊗n(ρ)∥∥∞ − 12n ≤
(
1 + ǫ
2
)n
− 1
2n
=
nǫ
2n
+
o(nǫ)
2n
.
Note that both bounds are tight and achieved for product states. ✷
Since the bounds in Theorem 2 are tight, any good independent encryption scheme requires that
the approximation parameter for each single qubit is ǫ = O( 1√
n
) for the 2-norm and ǫ = O( 1n) for
the ∞-norm. Hence, from equation (15) we conclude that the amount of entropy needed for the
encryption of n-qubit states is 2n− o(n).
V General N-qubit Encryption Schemes
In the previous section, we found the optimal way to independently compose single-qubit encryption
schemes in order to encrypt n-qubit states. However, one can do better with encryption schemes
that do not act independently on each qubit. For example, the encryption scheme in [5] uniformly
picks an n-qubit unitary from a set of O(n2n) random ones and hence it is not an independent
encoding. Note also that it only uses n+ log n+O(1) bits of entropy.
Ambainis and Smith ([3]) managed to derandomize the encryption scheme of [5] by explicitly
describing the set of unitaries. In particular, they use a set of 2n-bit strings, where each string
corresponds to a product of n Pauli matrices (the bits {2j − 1, 2j} define the Pauli matrix for the
j-th qubit). They prove that if the set of strings is a small-bias set of size O(n2n), then picking a
random unitary from this set gives an (ǫ, n+ 2 log n+ 2 log 1ǫ ) encryption scheme in the 2-norm.
A δ-biased set is a set of k-bit strings such that for all possible subsets of bits, the probability
over the set that the parity of the subset is 0, is [12 − δ, 12 + δ]. Naor and Naor [7] gave the first such
construction with size polynomial in k and 1/δ. Alon, Goldreich, Hastad and Peralta [1] showed a
lower bound on the size of a δ-biased set
N(k, δ) ≥ Ω
(
min
{
k
δ2 log(1/δ)
, 2k
})
Since we are interested in encryption schemes which use less than 2n bits of entropy, we only consider
δ-biased sets of size o(22n) and hence δ = ω( 12n ). Ambainis and Smith showed the following:
There exists a function δ(n) = ω( 12n ) such that any O(δ(n))-biased set gives rise to a
good encryption scheme in the 2-norm and moreover it has size N = o(22n).
In fact, their result holds for any δ(n) = 1
α(n)2n/2
, where α(n) is any slowly growing function of n (e.g.
log n). Note, that there are explicit constructions of such small-bias sets of sizeN = poly(α(n), n)2n.
However, it was an open question whether the same holds for the case of ∞-norm. Here, we resolve
this question by providing a counterexample. We show that
For any δ(n) = ω( 12n ) there exists a O(δ(n))-biased set of size N = o(2
2n) which is not
good in the ∞-norm.
Let us, first, compute the norm
∥∥R(ρ)− I2n∥∥∞, where R is a Pauli encryption scheme and ρ =
|z+〉⊗n 〈z+|⊗n. The density matrix of this state in the z-basis is
ρ =
(
I+ Z
2
)⊗n
=


1 0 . . .
0 0 . . .
...
...
. . .

 .
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The unitaries in the encryption scheme can be written as Uk = Uk1 ⊗· · ·⊗Ukn with Uki ∈ {I,X, Y, Z}.
For each unitary Uk we define a string χk ∈ {0, 1}n with χki = 0 if Uki ∈ {I, Z}, and χki = 1 if
Uki ∈ {X,Y }. Note that XZX = Y ZY = −Z and ZZZ = IZ I = Z, and hence
R(ρ) =
1
N
N∑
k=1
(
I+ (−1)χk1Z
2
)
⊗ · · · ⊗
(
I+ (−1)χknZ
2
)
.
The density matrix of the encrypted state is again diagonal in the z-basis and therefore, its eigen-
values are simply its diagonal elements. The size of each eigenvalue λχ is exactly the number of
unitaries Uk with the same corresponding string χ divided by N . Thus,∥∥∥∥R(ρ)− I2n
∥∥∥∥
∞
= max
χ
∣∣∣∣λχ − 12n
∣∣∣∣ = maxχ
∣∣∣∣ 1N (#of unitaries with the same χ)− 12n
∣∣∣∣ .
It is easy to see that starting from any small-bias set we can create a set which is asymptotically
as good as the initial one and it has the extra property that it contains at least a δ(n) fraction of
the unitaries with χ = 0. We start with a O(δ(n))-biased set of size N and add δ(n)N unitaries
with χ = 0 to the initial set. The new set has size N ′ = O(N) and bias O(δ(n)), and therefore, it
is asymptotically as good as the original set. Hence∥∥∥∥R(ρ)− I2n
∥∥∥∥
∞
= max
χ
∣∣∣∣ 1N ′ (#of unitaries with the same χ)− 12n
∣∣∣∣ ≥ O(δ(n)) − 12n = ω
(
1
2n
)
,
which means that the encryption scheme R is not good in the ∞-norm. In other words, we show
that although a δ-biased set encryption scheme is always good for the 2-norm, this is not the case
for the ∞-norm. However, it is still conceivable that one might be able to use δ-biased sets with
some extra properties in order to achieve good encryption for the ∞-norm.
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A Appendix
A.1 Minimization of the entropy H(ǫ, z)
Here, we provide the details for the minimization of the function H(ǫ, z) with respect to z that
concludes the proof of the optimal trade-off between approximation and entropy. Recall that
H(ǫ, z) = −
(
1
2
+ ǫ− z
)
log
(
1
2
+ ǫ− z
)
− 2z log z −
(
1
2
− ǫ− z
)
log
(
1
2
− ǫ− z
)
.
and the constraints are
1
4
+
ǫ
2
≥ z ≥ 1
4
− ǫ
2
, (13)
1
2
− ǫ ≥ z. (14)
The entropy as a function of z is again a concave function and hence, in order to find the minimum
we investigate the endpoints of the allowed interval for z. There are two cases:
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Case 1: for ǫ ≤ 1/6, the constraint (4) is tighter. The left endpoint is {14 + ǫ2 , 14 + ǫ2 , 14 + ǫ2 , 14 − 3ǫ2 },
giving
H1(ǫ) = −3
(
1
4
+
ǫ
2
)
log
(
1
4
+
ǫ
2
)
−
(
1
4
− 3ǫ
2
)
log
(
1
4
− 3ǫ
2
)
= 2− 6
ln 2
ǫ2 +O(ǫ3)
The right endpoint is {14 + 3ǫ2 , 14 − ǫ2 , 14 − ǫ2 , 14 − ǫ2}, giving
H2(ǫ) = −
(
1
4
+
3ǫ
2
)
log
(
1
4
+
3ǫ
2
)
− 3
(
1
4
− ǫ
2
)
log
(
1
4
− ǫ
2
)
At ǫ = 0, H1 = H2 = 2. At ǫ = 1/6, H1 ≤ H2. The derivative of H2 −H1 is always negative,
d(H2 −H1)
dǫ
=
3
2
log
(1− 2ǫ) (1− 6ǫ)
(1 + 2ǫ) (1 + 6ǫ)
≤ 0,
so we conclude that H1 is the best choice for ǫ ≤ 1/6. At ǫ = 1/6, H1 achieves the value of log2 3,
which means only three equally weighed unitaries are used.
Case 2: for ǫ ≥ 1/6, the constraint (5) is tighter, changing the left endpoint of z to z = 1/2−ǫ. This
sets y = 0, which is the regime of using only three unitaries, i.e. the distribution is {2ǫ, 12−ǫ, 12−ǫ, 0}
and the entropy
H3(ǫ) = −2ǫ log 2ǫ− 2
(
1
2
− ǫ
)
log
(
1
2
− ǫ
)
.
The second derivative of H3 −H2 is always negative,
d2
dǫ2
(H3 −H2) = −2 [ǫ(1− 2ǫ)(1 + 6ǫ) ln 2]−1 ,
so the function H3 −H2 is concave. That allows for only two points where H3 = H2. One of them
is at ǫ = 1/2, the other is found numerically to be ǫ0 ≈ 0.287 with H0 ≈ 1.41. We conclude that
for 1/6 ≤ ǫ ≤ ǫ0, the choice of H3 is optimal, whereas for ǫ0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1/2, the best choice is H2.
A.2 Another proof of optimality of Pauli Encryption Schemes
It is known [10] that every unital channel E with weights {wk} and unitaries Uk is equivalent to a
Pauli channel with some other weights {xm}, that is
E(ρ) =
∑
k
wkUkρU
†
k , (15)
E(ρ) = x1ρ+ x2XρX + x3Y ρY + x4ZρZ. (16)
This channel is an ǫ-randomizing map. We will prove that the Pauli realization of it has smaller
entropy.
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Suppose we act with this channel on one half of the Bell state |ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉). The
first definition of E will give us
ρ′ = E(ρ) =
∑
k
wk (Uk ⊗ I) |ψ+〉〈ψ+| (Uk ⊗ I)† =
∑
k
wk |ψk〉 〈ψk| , (17)
where |ψk〉 = (Uk ⊗ I) |ψ+〉 are pure states. On the other hand, the second realization of E (with
Pauli operations) acting on one half of the state |ψ+〉 will transform it into a state with density
matrix diagonal in the Bell basis, ρ′ = diag(x1, x2, x3, x4).
In [9], Nielsen showed that when a density matrix can be expressed as ρ′ =
∑
k wk |ϕk〉 〈ϕk|,
where |ϕk〉 are normalized states, the (ordered) vector of probabilities wk is majorized by the vector
of eigenvalues of ρ′, that is (wk) ≺ λ(ρ′).
In our case, the vector of eigenvalues of ρ′ is (xm), and the majorization (wk) ≺ (xm) means∑n
m=1 wm ≤
∑n
m=1 xm for any n ≥ 1. Note that if the length of (wk) is greater than four, we pad
the vector (xm) by zero entries to make the lengths of the vectors equal.
The entropy function is concave. Because the vector of weights for the Pauli realization (xk)
majorizes the vector of weights for the original realization (wk), the Pauli realization of the channel
has smaller entropy, S({xk}) ≤ S({wk}). This means the Pauli channel is the optimal (entropy-
wise) realization of any unital channel.
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